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AARON WOLF and JOHN ROSS*

The Impact of Scarce
Water Resources on the
Arab-Israeli Conflict
ABSTRACT
The Jordan River watershed is included within the borders of
countries and territorieseach of whose water consumption is currently approachingor surpassingannual recharge. The region is als6
particularly volatile politically, with five Arab-Israeli wars since
1948, and many tenacious issues yet unresolved. This paper suggests
that scarce water resources are actually inextricably related to
regionalconflict, having led historically to intense, and sometimes
armed, competition, but also to occasional instances of cooperation
between otherwise hostile players. The focus on water as a strategic
resourcehas particularrelevance to policy options given,for example,
Israel's relianceon the West Bank for a share of its water resources,
and the water needs of at least one impending wave of immigrationto
the region. Included in the paper are sections describing the natural
hydrographyand water consumption patterns of the region, a brief
history of politicalevents affected by 'hydro-strategic'considerations,
and a survey of some resourcestrategy alternativesfor the future.
INTRODUCTION
All of the countries and territories riparian to the Jordan RiverIsrael, Syria, Jordan, and the West Bank'-are currently using between 95
* Dr. Aaron Wolf is currently a fellow at the Center for Environmental Policy Studies, Institute for Environmental Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison. His Ph.D. dissertation
describes the impact of scarce water resources on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and methods for
resolving international water disputes. John Ross is a professor of agricultural journalism
and environmental studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, whose research focus is
the politics of scarce resources.The authors wish to thank the University of Wisconsin Institute for Environmental Studies, Center for Environmental Policy Studies for the support necessary to complete research for this paper.
1. Although Yasir Arafat declared the West Bank part of an independent Palestine along
with the Gaza Strip in December 1988, the area remains under Israeli military occupation as
it has been since June 1967. Because of its tenuous status, the West Bank is treated as a separate political entity in this study.
Note: The place names used in this study are those common to the country within whose
borders the location falls. For example, what is also known as the Sea of Galilee or Lake Tiberis is referred to here as Lake Kinneret.
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percent and more than 100 percent of their annual renewable freshwater
supply.2 In recent dry years, water consumption has routinely exceeded
annual supply, the difference usually being made up through overdraft of
fragile groundwater systems. By the end of the century, shortages will be
the norm. Projected water requirements for the year 2000 are 2500 million
cubic meters (MCM) annually for Israel, approximately 130 percent of current renewable supplies, and 1000 MCM, or 120 percent of current supplies, for Jordan. Syrian water data are tightly controlled by the
government, but one
estimate puts that country's water deficit for the year
4
2000 at 1000 MCM.

Superimposed on this regional water shortage are the political
boundaries of countries which have been in a technical, when not actual,
state of war since 1948. In fact, much of the political conflict has been
either precipitated or exacerbated by conflicts over scarce water resources.
Water-related incidents include the first Arab summit with the consequent
establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964,
armed escalation between Syria and Israel leading up to the Six-Day War
in 1967 and, according to some, the war itself, as well as the current
impasse over the final status of the West Bank. Israel's incursions into Lebanon and its continued presence there have also been linked to a 'hydraulic imperative.' With only 1400 MCM of usable flow annually, 5 the Jordan
River is the smallest major watershed in the region, as compared to the
Nile with 74,000 MCM/yr. or the Euphrates at 32,000 MCM/yr. But,
because of its geopolitical position, the Jordan has been described as "having witnessed more severe international conflict over water than any other.
river system in the Middle
East and remains by far the most likely flash6
point for the future."
In addition to a natural increase in demand for water due to growing populations and economies, the region can expect dramatic demographic changes from at least three sources. Israel expects about an
additional million Soviet Jewish immigrants over the next decade 7 --a 25
percent increase in its present population. Jordan, meanwhile, is doing its
best to absorb 300,000 Palestinians expelled from Kuwait in the wake of
the Gulf War. Finally, talks are being initiated over a greater level of autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Presumably, an
autonomous Palestine would strive to absorb and settle a number of the
2. J. Starr & D. Stoll, U.S. Foreign Policy on Water Resources in the Middle East 6-7 (1987).
3. F. Frey & T. Naff, Water: An EmergingIssue in the Middle East?482 Annals Am. Acad. Pol.
& Soc. Sci. 65,67-68 (1985).
4. Starr & Stoll, supra note 2, at 9.
5. Frey & Naff, supra note 3, at 67.
6. E. Anderson, Water: The Next Strategic Resource in The Politics of Scarcity: Water in the
Middle East 10 (J. Starr & D. Stoll eds., 1988).
7. Soviet Jews, Arab Fearsand Israel, New York limes, February 23,1990, at A10.
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2.2 million Palestinians registered worldwide as refugees. 8 The absorption
of any or all of these groups of immigrants will have profound impacts on
regional water demands.
Given the important role of water in the history of the Mideast
conflict, and given imminent water shortages in this volatile region, the
future can appear foreboding. Two recent American studies of the links
between water resources and politics in the Middle East were sponsored
by agencies whose primary interests are strategic or defense related. 9 Naff
and Matson (1984) was commissioned by the Defense Intelligence Agency
in 1984, and studies by Starr and Stoll, done in 1987 and 1988, were carried
out under the auspices of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. The executive summary of the latter report begins,
Before the twenty-first century, the struggle over limited and threatened water resources could sunder
already fragile ties among regional states10and lead to
unprecedented upheaval within the area.
There is, however, some room for optimism. Along with being
an impetus to conflict, water has also been a vehicle for cooperation.
Throughout the 45 years of hostilities, water issues have been the subject
of occasional secret talks and even some negotiated agreements between
the states in the region. In the future, cooperation on regional water planning or technology might actually help provide momentum toward negotiated political settlement. According to Frey and Naff, "precisely because
it is essential to life and so highly charged, water can-perhaps even tends
to-produce cooperation even in the absence of trust between concerned
actors." 11 Finally, the pressures to cooperate might very well come from a
clear understanding of the alternative. "If the people in the region are not
clever enough to discuss a mutual solution to the problem of water scarWater Commissioner, is quoted as saycity," Meir Ben-Meir, former Israeli
12
ing, "then war is unavoidable."
What follows is an overview of the interplay between the waters
of the Jordan River and the conflict between the states through which they
flow. Included are sections on the natural hydrography of the watershed,
a brief history of water-related conflict and cooperation in the region, and
a survey of some resource strategy alternatives for the future.
8. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, The West Bank and Gaza: Israel's Options for Peace
206(1989).
9. Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation? (T. Naff & R. Matson eds., 1984); The
Politics of Scarcity: Water in the Middle East, supra note 6.
10. Starr & Stoll, supra note 2, at 1.
11. Frey & Naff, supra note 3, at 67.
12. A. Gowers & T. Walker, Middle East Fears War of Parched Throats, Financial limes (London), February 21,1989, at 7.
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HYDROGRAPHY
A. Surface Water
The Jordan River watershed drains an area of 18,300 km 2 in four
countries: Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan. 13 (See Figure 1-Jordan
River Watershed and Figures 3 and 4-International Borders.)
Three springs make up the northern headwaters of the Jordan: the
Hasbani, rising in Lebanon with an average annual flow of 125 MCM/yr.,
the Banias in Syria, averaging 125 MCM/yr., and the Dan, the largest
spring at 250 MCM/yr. and originating in Israel. The streams from these
into Israel and flow south to Lake Kinsprings converge six kilometers
14
neret at 210 m below sea level.
The Yarmuk River has sources both in Syria and Jordan and forms
the border between those countries before it adds about 500 MCM/yr. to
the Jordan 10 kilometers south of Lake Kinneret. Beyond this confluence,
the Jordan picks up volume from springflow and intermittent tributaries
along its 320 kilometer meander southward along the valley floor of the
Syrio-African Rift. At its terminus at the Dead Sea 400 m below sea level,
the Jordan River has a natural annual flow of 1400 MCM/yr. (See Table
1-Water Balance of the Jordan River System.)
Because much of the Jordan's flow is below sea level and the small
which
contribute to its flow pass first through the salty remains of
springs
ancient seas, the salinity of the water rises greatly even as its flow
increases. Though the headwaters at the Hasbani, Banias, and Dan have a
salinity of 15-20 parts per million (ppm), levels at the south end of Lake
Kinneret are 340 ppm. This is diluted somewhat by the Yarmuk, which has
a salinity of 100 ppm, but increases significantly downstream, reaching
several thousand parts per million by the Allenby Bridge near Jericho. The
Dead Sea, a terminal lake, has a salinity of 250,000 ppm, seven times that
of the ocean.
The river flows through the transition zone from the Mediterranean subtropical climate of Lebanon and the Galilee region in the north to
the arid conditions of the Negev Desert and the Rift Valley to the south.
Rainfall pattern likewise varies spatially, with decreasing rainfall generally from north to south and from west to east.
It should be kept in mind that these streamflow values are for
average flows of the natural system. The actual amounts are highly variable and dependent on both seasonal fluctuations-75 percent of precipi13. Naff & Matson, supra note 9, at 21.
14. Flow data are taken from M. Garbell, Water Policymaking in Israel, 212 Pol'y Analysis 23,
25-26 (1965); M. Inbar & J.Maos, Water Resource Planningand Development in the Northern Jordan Valley, 9 Water Int'l 18, 18-25 (1984); Naff & Matson, supra note 9, at 182; D. Wishart, An
Economic Approach to UnderstandingJordan Valley Water Disputes, 21 Middle East Rev. 45, 46
(1989).
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Subdivisions and Water Balance of the Jordan River System
Flow (MCM/YR)

Source

Country

Gain

Israel

245

Lebanon

138

Syria

121

Loss

Total

Upper Jordan
Dan
Hasbani
Banias

504

Jordan in Huleh Valley
Irrigation in Huleh Valley
Local runoff Huleh
to Jisr Banat Yaqub

-100

Israel
Israel/Syria

140
544

Flow into Lake Tiberias
In Lake Tiberias
Local runoff
Rainfall over lake
Springs in and around lake
Evaporation over Lake Tiberias

Israel/Syria

70

Israel

65

Israel

65
-270

Israel

474

Outflow to Lower Jordan
Yarmuk

Syria/Jordan

92

966

1471
505
Jordan/Israel Wadis and springs in Ghor
Source: Smith (1966), as revised from Main Plan and Hydrological Yearbook of Israel (1946-1960). From
Naff and Matson (1984).

tation falls during the four winter months-as well as annual variations in
rainfall, which can be as high as 25-40 percent. 15 Also, the natural system
has been dramatically altered by large-scale diversion projects, as will be
discussed later.
B. Groundwater
The hills along both banks of the Jordan serve as recharge areas

for extensive aquifer systems in the West Bank, Israel and Jordan. Rain
which falls on these mountain ridges and does not run off as surface water
percolates down to the water table and contributes to these underground
bodies of water saturation. 16 One measure of an aquifer's utility is its safe
15. Environmental Protection Service, State of Israel, The Environment in Israel 125 (1988).
16. Strictly speaking, some of the aquifers discussed here are not technically part of the Jordan watershed. However, they are such integral parts of the issues presented that they are
included in the study.
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yield, or the amount of water which can be pumped without adverse
effects to the water left in storage. This is usually considered to be equal to
the annual recharge rate.
Thereare three principal aquifer systems west of the Jordan. 17 The
northeast basin recharges in the northern West Bank, discharges in Israel's
Bet Shean and Jezreel Valleys, and has a safe yield of 140 MCM/yr. The
western, or Yarkon-Tanninim, basin also recharges in the hills of the West
Bank but discharges westward, toward the Mediterranean coast in Israel
and has a safe yield of 335 MCM/yr. The eastern basin is made up of five
separate catchment areas in the West Bank, all of which flow east toward
the Jordan Valley and have a combined safe yield of 125 MCM.
Groundwater values for Jordan are much less accessible. One
1978 estimate puts total groundwater resources available at 12,000
MCM. 18 It is not clear how much of this is renewable recharge and how
much is in storage and not renewed annually.
C. Current Water Use
Israel has a renewable annual water supply of approximately
1800 MCM/yr.19 Of this, 60 percent is groundwater and 40 percent is surface water-almost entirely from the Jordan River system. Its water budget is allocated to agriculture (73 percent), domestic consumption (22
percent), and industrial use (5 percent). Israel irrigates 66 percent of its
cropland, has a population of 4.2 million and an annual population
growth rate of 1.6 percent (excluding immigration).2 0
The 800,000 Palestinians on the West Bank consume about 110
MCM/yr.-90 percent of which is groundwater. Of this, about 90 MCM is
for irrigation and the rest is for domestic use. The 70,000 Israeli settlers use
an additional 36 MCM, 95 percent of which is for agriculture. 21 The residents of the West Bank, Arab and Jewish, irrigate 6 percent of the cultivatable land and have a population growth rate of approximately 3 percent. 22
Gaza, with a population of about 600,000 growing at a rate of 3.4
percent annually, is probably the most desperate entity hydrographically.
Completely dependent on the 60 MCM/yr. of annual groundwater
recharge, Gazans currently use approximately 95 MCM/yr. The difference
between annual supply and use is made up by overpumping in the shallow coastal aquifer, resulting in dangerous salt-water intrusion of existing
17. D. Kahan, Agricultural and Water Resources in the West Bank and Gaza 1967-1987, at
21 (1987). Not included in this list are the Carmel aquifer, lying wholly in Israel, with a safe
yield of 375 MCM annually or the sandstone Gaza aquifer whose 60 MCM annual yield is
currently being seriously overmined.
18. Wishart, supra note 14, at 46.
19. Environmental Protection Service, supra note 15, at 125.
20. S. Postel, Trouble on Tap, Worldwatch 12 (1989).
21. Kahan, supranote 17, at 113.
22. Postel, supranote 20, at 14.
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wells and ever-decreasing per capita water availability, which is already
the lowest in the region.
Jordan has a total annual water budget of 870 MCM of which 75
percent is surface water-mostly from the Yarmuk River.23 Of the total, 85
percent is allocated for agriculture, 10 percent for personal consumption,
and 5 percent for industrial use. Jordan irrigates 10 percent of its cropland
and has a population of 3.3 million which is growing at a rate of 3.5 percent per year. 4
Both Lebanon and Syria are relatively minor consumers of Jordan
River water. Their major sources are the Litani and Euphrates Rivers,
respectively. The Litani, with an average flow of 700 MCM/yr., lies wholly
within Lebanon but, because it flows to within seven kilometers of the
Hasbani, it has been included in several diversion schemes in conjunction
with the Jordan system. Lebanon irrigates 29 percent of its cropland, has a
population of 2.6 million, and an annual rate of population growth of 2.1
percent. Syria irrigates 11 percent of its cropland and has a population of
10 million which is growing at a rate of 3.8 percent per year."
WATER, CONFLICT, AND COOPERATION
A. Pre-1948
Since biblical times, water has played a role in the history of the
Mideast, although issues of water conflict and cooperation have become
especially intense with the growing nationalist feelings and populations
of this century. These issues are also relevant to the current impassesparticularly between Israel and the Palestinians on the West Bank.
Living as they do in a transition zone between Mediterranean
subtropical and arid climates, the people in and around the Jordan watershed have always been aware of the limits imposed by scarce water
resources. Settlements sprang up in fertile valleys or near large, permanent wells, and trade routes were established from oasis to oasis. Even in
biblical times, variations in water supply had their impact on the region's
history. It was drought, for example, that drove Jacob and his family to
Egypt, an event which led to years of slavery and, finally, to the birth of
the Israelite nation 400 years later.2 6 Even then the waters of the Jordan
were occasionally intertwined with military strategy as, for instance,
when Joshua directed his priests to stem the river's flow with the power of
23. S. Taubenblatt, JordanRiver Basin Water: A Challenge in the 1990s in The Politics of Scarcity: Water in the Middle East, supra note 9, at 49.
24. Postel, supra note 20, at 14.
25. Id.
26. Genesis 41.
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he and his army marched across the dry
the Ark of the Covenant while
27
riverbed to attack Jericho.
In the centuries since, the inhabitants of the region and the conquering nations which came and went have lived mostly within the limits
of their water resources, using combinations of surface water and well
water for survival and livelihood. Some, like the Nabateans (last two centuries B.C.E.) and the Byzantines (fifth and sixth centuries C.E.), were particularly successful at using a catchment/cistern method for capturing
ephemeral flash-floodwater which made possible their comparatively
extensive settlements in the arid south. 28
In this century, with the developing nationalism of both Arabs
and Jews and subsequent population pressures, water has continued to be
a critical strategic resource. When, after the first Zionist Congress in Basle
in 1895, the idea of creating a Jewish State in Palestine, which by then had
been under Ottoman rule for 400 years, began to crystallize in the plans of
European Jewry, Theodore Herzl, considered the father of modem Zionism, traveled to the region to see what practical possibilities existed. In
Jerusalem, Herzl met with the German Kaiser, whose influence with the
Sultan he sought to enlist. Barbara Tuchman describes the meeting outside
the Mikveh Israel colony:
The Kaiser rode up, guarded by Turkish outriders,
reigned in his horse, shook hands with Herzl to the
awe of the crowd, remarked on the heat, pronounced
Palestine a land with a future, "but it needs water,
plenty of water," shook hands again, and rode off. 29
After World War I, the area came under British and French influence, but the Kaiser's advice must have hit home. In 1917, England issued
the Balfour Declaration, pledging a Jewish National Home in Palestine. In
1919, when Great Britain and France sat down at Versailles to divide up
the area, Zionist planners urged that the boundaries of the Jewish state
extend northward to the Litani River and include all of the headwaters of
the Jordan. 30 Chaim Weizmann, later Israel's first president, wrote to British Prime Minister David Lloyd George that, "the boundaries cannot be
drawn exclusively on historic lines ... our claims to the north are imperatively demanded by the requirements of modern economic life." 3 r (See
Figure 2-Border Proposals.)
27. Joshua 4.
28. W. Lowdermilk, Palestine: Land of Promise (1944).
29. B. Tuchman, Bible and Sword 291 (1956).
30. J. Dillman, Water Rights in the Occupied Territories, 19 J. Palestine Stud. 46,48 (1989); L.
Schmida, Keys of Control: Israel's Pursuit of Arab Water Resources 4 (1983); G. Stevens, Jordan River Partition 24 (1965).
31. Dilman, supra note 30, at 48.
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At French insistence, however, the borders of the new states of
Lebanon and Syria were set south of the Litani and west of the slopes of
Mount Hermon, leaving the headwaters of the Jordan system in these
French mandated territories. 32 The British established Transjordan east of
the Jordan River, but the area between the river and the sea remained British-mandate Palestine.
Between the wars, water became the focus of the greater political
argument over Palestine's absorptive capacity for the increasing number
of Jewish immigrants. Several hydrologic surveys were undertaken by the
British but not much development took place except for the granting of a
70 year concession to Pinhas Rutenberg, a Jewish engineer, to develop a
hydropower project at the confluence of the Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers in
1926.3 Though Rutenberg's dam was destroyed in the 1948 war, Israel has
occasionally argued for greater allocation of Yarmuk water on the basis of
his concession.
Two conflicting hydrologic studies came out immediately before
and during World War II. The lonides Plan, published in Amman in 1939
by the British Director of Development for the Transjordanian government, supported the Arab claim that the region's water resources were
inadequate for Jewish immigration. The MacDonald White Paper, limiting
additional immigration to a total of 75,000 Jews, was enacted that same
year and remained in effect until Israeli statehood in 1948. 34 British warships effected a naval blockade throughout and after the war to enforce
the ban.
In 1944, Dr. Walter Lowdermilk of the United States Soil Conservation Service, published Palestine,Land of Promise at the commission of
the Jewish Agency. Lowdermilk asserted that proper water management
would generate resources for four million Jewish refugees in addition to
the 1.8 million Arabs and Jews living in Palestine at the time. He advocated regional water management, based on the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), to develop irrigation on both banks of the Jordan River and in
the Negev Desert, and to build a canal from the Mediterranean to the
Dead Sea to generate hydropower and replenish the diverted fresh35
water.
The differences between these plans were not resolved, though
the British "remained highly skeptical" of both Lowdermilk's estimates
and of the possibility for the Arab-Jewish cooperation necessary for the
implementation of his "Jordan Valley Authority."36 In 1947, however, the
recently created United Nations, notified that the British would shortly
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Stevens, supra note 30, at 25.
Naff & Matson, supra note 9, at 30.
Schmida, supra note 30, at 5.
Naff & Matson, supra note 9, at 32.
Id.
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cede their mandate, developed the Partition Plan for both a Jewish and an
Arab state in Palestine, which included just such a vehicle for joint economic development, "especially
in respect of irrigation, land reclamation,
"3
and soil conservation.
Though the Jewish Agency accepted partition, the Arab states
rejected it and, when the British pulled out of Palestine in May 1948,
Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia went to war against
the new State of Israel.
B. 1948-1967
The immediate repercussions of the 1948 war were dramatic
demographic shifts throughout the region. Israel absorbed much of the
remnants of European Jewry, many of whom had been kept in Cypriot refugee camps by the British since World War II, as well as the 700,000 Jews
from Arab countries who emigrated after Israel's declaration of independence. The Israeli Jewish population increased from 650,000 in 1948 to 1.6
million in 1952.38
Jordan was also greatly affected by refugee immigration. Of the
700,000 to 900,000 Palestinian refugees of the war, 450,000 went to Jordan
and the West Bank, which Jordan first occupied, then annexed in 1950.
This influx and annexation increased Jordan's population by 80 percent to
39
1.85 million.
Even as the dust was settling, Syria approached Israel with a
secret offer which, for the first time, linked three topics which would
define the negotiating issues for the coming decades-peace, refugee
resettlement, and water. Colonel Hosni Zaim, who took control of Syria in
a military coup in April 1949 sent a secret message to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion offering to sign a separate peace agreement, establish a joint militia, and settle 300,000 Palestinian refugees in Syrian
territory in exchange for some "minor border changes" along the ceasefire line and half of Lake Kinneret. 40 Ben-Gurion was reluctant to make
such an agreement and signed a limited armistice instead. Less than a year
later, Zaim was overthrown.
In 1951, several states announced unilateral plans for the Jordan
watershed. Arab states began to discuss organized exploitation of two
northern sources of the Jordan-the Hasbani and the Banias.4 1 The Israelis
made public their "All Israel Plan" which included the draining of Huleh
Lake and swamps, diversion of the northern Jordan River and construc37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Institute for Palestine Studies, International Documents on Palestine: 1967, at 17 (1970).
Naff & Matson, supranote 9, at 34.
Id.
A. Shalev, Cooperation in the Shadow of Conflict (1989).
Stevens, supra note 30, at 38.
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tion of a carrier to the coastal plain and Negev Desert-the first out-ofbasin transfer for the watershed.4 2
Jordan announced a plan to irrigate the East Ghor of the Jordan
Valley by tapping the Yarmuk.4 3 At Jordan's announcement, Israel closed
the gates of an existing dam south of Lake Kinneret and began draining
the Huleh swamps, which infringed on the demilitarized zone with Syria.
This action led to a series of border skirmishes between Israel and Syria
which escalated over the summer of 1951 and prompted Israeli Foreign
Minister Moshe Sharrett to declare clearly that, "Our soldiers in the north
are defending the Jordan water sources so that water may be brought to
the farmers of the Negev."44
In March 1953, Jordan and the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) signed an agreement to begin implementing the 'Bunger Plan,' which called for a dam at Maqarin on the Yarmuk
River with a storage capacity of 480 MCM and a diversion dam at Addassiyah which would direct gravity flow along the East Ghor of the Jordan
Valley. The water would both open land for irrigation and provide power
for Syria and Jordan and offer resettlement for 100,000 refugees. In June
1953, Jordan and Syria agreed to share the Yarmuk but Israel protested
that its riparian rights-rights commonly recognized as being due to entities which border a waterway-were not being recognized. 45
In July 1953, Israel began construction on the intake of its National
Water Carrier at Gesher B'not Ya'akov north of Lake Kinneret and in the
46
demilitarized zone. Syria deployed its armed forces along the border 47
and artillery units opened fire on the construction and engineering sites.
Syria also protested to the U.N. and, though a 1954 resolution for the
resumption of work by Israel carried a majority, the USSR vetoed the resolution. The Israelis then moved the intake to its
current site at Eshed Kin48
rot on the northwestern shore of the Kinneret.
This was a doubly costly move for Israel. First, as mentioned earlier, water salinity is much higher in the lake than in the upper Jordan. The
initial water pumped in 1964 was actually unsuitable for some agriculture.
Since that time, Israel has diverted saline springs away from the lake and
49
filtered carrier water through artificial recharge to ease this problem.
Second, the water from B'not Ya'akov would have flowed to the Negev by

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Naff & Matson, supra note 9, at 38.
Stevens, supranote 30, at 39.
Id.
Naff & Matson, supra note 9, at 38.
U. Davis et al., Israel's Water Policies, 9 J. Palestine Stud. 3, 8 (1980)
J. Cooley, The War Over Water, 54 Foreign Pol'y 3,10 (1984).
Garbell, supranote 14, at 30.
Stevens, supranote 30, at 9.
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gravity alone. Instead, 450 MCM/yr. is currentlyumped a height of
250 m before it starts its 240 km journey southward.°U
Against this tense background, President Dwight Eisenhower
sent his special envoy Eric Johnston to the Mideast in October 1953 to try
to mediate a comprehensive settlement of the Jordan River system allocations. 51 Johnston's initial proposals were based on a study carried out by
Charles Main and the TVA at the request of UNRWA to develop the area's
water resources and to provide for refugee resettlement. The TVA
addressed the problem with the regional approach Lowdermilk had advocated a decade earlier. As Gordon Clapp, Chairman of the TVA wrote in
his letter of presentation, "the report describes the elements of an efficient
arrangement of water supply within the watershed of the Jordan River
System. It does not consider political factors or attempt to set this system
into the national boundaries now prevailing." 52 This apolitical, basinwide approach produced not only the thorough technical report which
was to be the basis of two years of negotiations, but also stunning oversize
maps which delineate only one border-that of the Jordan River watershed. (See Figure 5-Topography.)
The major features of the Main Plan included small dams on the
Hasbani, Dan and Banias, a medium size (175 MCM storage) dam at
Maqarin, additional storage at Lake Kinneret, and gravity flow canals
down both sides of the Jordan Valley. The Main Plan excludes the Litani
and describes only in-basin use of the Jordan River water, although it concedes that "it is recognized that each of these countries may have different
ideas about the specific areas within their boundaries to which these
waters might be directed." 53 Preliminary allocations gave Israel 394
MCM/yr., Jordan 774 MCM/yr, and Syria 45 MCM/yr (See Table 2Water Allocations.)
Israel responded to the Main Plan with the 'Cotton Plan' which
incorporated many of Lowdermilk's ideas. This plan called for inclusion
of the Litani, out-of-basin transfers to the coastal plain and the Negev, and
the use of Lake Kinneret as the main storage facility, thereby diluting its
salinity. It allocated Israel 1290 MCM/yr, including 400 MCM/yr. from
the Litani, Jordan 575 MCM/yr., Syria 30 MCM/yr. and Lebanon 450
MCM/yr
In 1954, representatives from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt
established the Arab League Technical Committee under Egyptian leadership and formulated the 'Arab Plan.' It reaffirmed in-basin use, rejected
storage in Lake Kinneret, which lies wholly in Israel, and excluded the
50. Environmental Protection Service, supra note 15, at 136.
51. C. Main, The Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley Region
(1953).
52. Id.
53. Id.

,
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FIGURE 5. Topography of the Jordan Valley Region
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TABLE 2. Water Allocations of the Jordan River System (mcm/yr.)
Plan/Source

Lebanon

Syria

Jordan

Israel

Total

Main Plan

nil

45

774

394

1213

Arab Plan

35

132

698

182

1047

450.7

30

575

1290

Cotton Plana

2345.7

Unified (Johnston Plan)
Hasbani

35

Banias

35
20

20
b

Jordan (Main Stream)

22

100

375

Yarmuk

90

377

25

492

406b

1287 b

Side Wadis
Total Unified Plan

243
35

132

720

497b

243

a. The Cotton Plan included the Litani as part of the Jordan River System. Different plans allocated different amounts in accordance with differing estimates of the resources of the system. One major variable
in the reporting of the planned allocations is the amount of groundwater included in the estimates.
b. According to the compromise "Gardiner Formula," the share to Israel from the main stream of the
Jordan was defined as the "residue" after the other co-riparians had received their shares. This would
vary from year to year, but was expected to average 375 MCM.
Source: Naff and Matson (1984).

Litani. Its principal difference from the Johnston Plan was in the water
allocated to each state. Israel was to receive 182 MCM/yr., Jordan 698
MCM/yr., Syria 132 MCM/yr., and Lebanon 35 MCM/yr. in addition to
keeping all of the Litani.
Johnston worked until the end of 1955 to reconcile these proposals
in a Unified Plan amenable to all of the states involved. His dealings were
bolstered by a United States offer to fund two-thirds of the development
costs. His plan addressed the objections of both sides and accomplished
no small degree of compromise, although his neglect of groundwater
issues would later prove an important oversight. Though they had not
met face to face for these negotiations, all states agreed on the need for a
regional approach. Israel gave up on integration of the Litani and the
Arabs agreed to allow out-of-basin transfer. The Arabs objected, but
finally agreed, to storage at both the Maqarin Dam and Lake Kinneret so
long as neither side would have physical control over the share available
to the other. Israel objected, but finally agreed, to international supervision of withdrawals and construction. Allocations under the Unified Plan,
later known as the Johnston Plan, included 400 MCM/yr. to Israel, 720
MCM/yr. to Jordan, 132 MCM/yr. to Syria and 35 MCM/yr. to Lebanon.
The technical committees from both sides accepted the Unified
Plan, and the Israeli Cabinet approved it without vote in July 1955. President Nasser of Egypt became an active advocate because Johnston's proposals seemed to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian
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problem simultaneously. Among other proposals, Johnston envisioned
the diversion of Nile water to the western Sinai Desert to resettle two million Palestinian refugees. President Sadat would make this offer again 22
years later on his historic trip to Jerusalem in 1977.
Despite the forward momentum, the Arab League Council
decided not to accept the plan in October 1955, and the momentum died
out. Although the agreement was never ratified, both sides have generally
adhered to the technical details and allocations even while proceeding
with unilateral development. Agreement was encouraged by the United
States, which promised funding for future water development projects
only as long as the Johnston Plans allocations were adhered to. Since that
time to the present, Israeli and Jordanian water officials have met two or
three times a year at so-called 'Picnic Table Talks' at the confluence of the
Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers to discuss flow rates and allocations.
However, as individual projects progressed and hydrologic limits
began to be approached, the pressures quickly went from possible cooperation to impending conflict. (See Figure 3 -International Borders and
Water Diversions 1948-1967.)
By 1964, Israel had completed enough of its National Water Carrier that actual diversions from the Jordan River basin to the coastal plain
and the Negev were imminent. Although Jordan was also about to begin
extracting Yarmuk water for its East Ghor Canal, it was the Israeli diversion which prompted President Nasser to call for the First Arab Summit,
including heads of state from the region and North Africa, specifically to
discuss a joint strategy on water. The options were to complain to the
U.N., divert the upper Jordan tributaries into Arab states, as had been discussed by the Arab League since 1960, or to go to war.54 A military assessment revealed that the Arabs were unprepared for this last option and
might be incapable of defending their own river diversions should they
proceed.5 5 However, the decision to divert the rivers prevailed at the summit, and the states agreed to finance a Headwater Diversion Project in
Lebanon and Syria and to help Jordan build a dam on the Yarmuk.
One additional strategy was decided upon at the summit. The
conferees agreed to establish a Palestinian entity to "carry the banner of
Arab Palestine" 56 and to mobilize the Palestinians themselves for the
eventual "liberation of Palestine." 57 Yasir Arafat later combined this Palestine Liberation Army with his own Fatah and other groups to form the
Palestine Liberation Organization. 58 Given its roots, it is not surprising
that the nascent PLO's first action was an unsuccessful attempt to sabo54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Schmida, supra note 30, at 19.
Stevens, supranote 30, at 76.
Id.
Cooley, supranote 47, at 15.
Id.
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tage the Israeli National Water Carrier on December 31, 1964. As one associate of Arafat's put it, "The water issue was the crucial one. We
considered our impact on this to be the crucial test of our war with
Israel." 59
In 1964, Israel began withdrawing 320 MCM/yr. of Jordan water
for its National Water Carrier, and Jordan completed a major phase of its
East Ghor Canal. 60 In 1965, the Arab states began construction of their
Headwater Diversion Plan to prevent the Jordan headwaters from reaching Israel. The plan was to divert the Hasbani into the Litani in Lebanon
and the Banias into the Yarmuk, where it would be impounded for Jordan
and Syria by a dam at Mukheiba. Technically difficult, with water to be
pumped as high as 350 m, and economically inefficient, 61 the plan, to be
financed by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, would divert up to 125 MCM/yr.,
cut by 35 percent the installed capacity of the Israeli Carrier, and increase
the salinity in Lake Kinneret by 60 ppm.
Israel declared the impending diversion as an "infringement of its
sovereign rights." 62 Four times, in March and May 1965, July 1966, and
April 1967, Israeli army and air force attacked the diversion works in
Syria. These events set off what has been called "a prolonged chain reacthat linked directly to the events that led to the
tion of border violence
63
[June 1967] war."
In May 1967, President Nasser, who had earlier formed the
"United Arab Republic" with Syria, demanded the withdrawal of U.N.
forces from the Sinai, announced a blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, cutting
off the Israeli port of Eilat, and declared that, "the armies of Egypt, Jordan,
Syria and Lebanon are poised on the borders of Israel." On June 5, Israel
attacked the airfields of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria. Six days later, the
war was over and Israel had conquered the Golan Heights from Syria, the
West Bank from Jordan, and Gaza and the Sinai peninsula from Egypt.
Aside from territorial gains and obvious improvements in geostrategic positioning, Israel had also greatly improved its 'hydrostrategic'
position. (See Figure 4-International Borders, 1967-Present.) With the
Golan Heights, it now held all of the headwaters of the Jordan, with the
exception of a section of the Hasbani, and an overlook over much of the
Yarmuk, together making the Headwater Diversion impossible. The
Mukheiba Dam was destroyed and the Maqarin Dam, abandoned. The
West Bank not only provided riparian access to the entire length of the Jordan River, but it overlay three major aquifers, two of which Israel had
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.(quoting Dr. Nabil al-Shath).
Inbar & Maos, supranote 14, at 21.
For details, see id. at 22; Naff & Matson, supra note 9, at 43.
Naff & Matson, supra note 9, at 44.
Cooley, supranote 47, at 16 (quoting Professor Nadav Safran).
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been tapping into from its side of the Green Line since 1955.64 Jordan had
once planned to transport 70-150 MCM/yr. from the Yarmuk River to the
West Bank. These plans, too, were abandoned.
C. 1967-1982
In the wake of the 1967 war, former President Eisenhower, who 10
years earlier had sent Eric Johnston to the Mideast to negotiate a regional
water plan, made public a new cooperation scheme he and former Atomic
Energy Commissioner Lewis Strauss had formulated which they called
simply, "A Proposal for Our Time." Their plan, based this time on new
technology, called for three nuclear desalination plants, two on the Mediterranean coast and one at the Gulf of Aqaba, producing a combined output of about 1400 MCM of freshwater a year-roughly the usable flow of
Jordan River-as well as "an enormous amount" of electric
the entire
65
power.
As Eisenhower and Strauss saw it, the availability of these new
sources of energy and water would make possible an entire 'agro-industrial complex,' making an additional 4500 km 2 of barren land arable, and
providing work and agriculture to help settle more than a million Arab
refugees."6 The project, which would cost about a billion (1967) dollars,
would be funded by an international corporation set up for the purpose
and supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover,
Eisenhower predicted that the "collaboration of Arab and Jew in a practimagnitude might well be the first, long
cal and profitable enterprise of this
67
step toward a permanent peace."
In the summer of 1967, Eisenhower communicated his project to
President Lyndon Johnson. On July 28, the State Department announced
the appointment of an interim Director of Water for Peace. 68 In the fall,
Senator Howard Baker from Tennessee introduced a senate resolution
endorsing the plan as a method of "easingpolitical tensions in the Middle
East through international cooperation."69 The resolution was approved
unanimously by the Foreign Relations Committee and adopted without
dissent by the Senate. The project was studied in detail over the course of
the next five years by a technical group centered at the Oak Ridge
National Laboratories.
Despite the overwhelming political and technical obstacles, the
plan finally faltered on the basis of its economic evaluation. Duane Chap64. Garbell, supra note 14, at 30.
65. D. Eisenhower, A Proposalfor Our Time, Reader's Digest, June 1968, at 79.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 77.
68. L. Strauss, Dwight Eisenhower's "ProposalforOur Time," 19 National Review 1008, 1010
(1967).
69. Congressional Quarterly (1967).
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man of Cornell University summarized the Economic Analysis for the first
of the plants:
As presently designed, such a complex appears to
require deficit financing, provide little employment,
retard national income
growth... and increase foreign
70
exchange deficit.
The benefit-cost ratios that Chapman determined ranged from
1.03, using a social discount rate of 5 percent, to 0.55, with a rate of 15 percent. The Agro-Industrial Complex, which was to be the last attempt at
regionwide water cooperation, was finally shelved in the early 1970s.
As the 1960s came to a close, the PLO mounted an intensive guerrilla campaign against Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley. Israeli retaliation raids led to occasional conflict with Jordanian and Iraqi troops
stationed in the eastern part of the valley. In April and May 1969, Israeli
water authorities measured the Jordan River's base flow to be 686 mm
below its average for that period. Suspicion that Jordan was overdiverting
the Yarmuk may have combined with Israel's policy of holding the host
country partly responsible for Palestinian attacks and led to two Israeli
raids in June and August 1969 to destroy one of the most vulnerable targets in Jordan-the East Ghor Canal. The political rationale was that damage to the country's irrigation would pressure King Hussein to act against
the PLO. At the same time, the Jordanian Army, which saw too much latitude in PLO behavior in Jordan, was pressuring the King in the same
direction. Secret negotiations in 1969 and 1970 between Israel and Jordan,
mediated by the United States, led to an agreement. Israel was persuaded
that the drop in Jordan baseflow was natural and Jordan would be
allowed to repair the Canal. In exchange, Jordan agreed to adhere to the
Johnston Plan allocations and "pledged to terminate PLO activity in Jordan." 7 1 In 'Black September,' 1970, the Jordanian Army expelled the PLO
from Jordan. Estimates of the number of Palestinians killed in the process
range upward to 5,000.
After the expulsion of the PLO, Jordan set out on a two stage Jordan Valley Development Plan with Crown Prince Hassan, the king's 23year-old, Oxford-educated brother, taking charge. 72 The first stage, which
included a small 'King Talal Dam' on the Zarqa River, new irrigation networking and catchments on several wadis, was built, partially with
70. D. Chapman, Economic Aspects of a Nuclear DesalinationAgro-Industrial Project in the
United Arab Republic, 55 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 433 (1973).
Note: A benefit-cost ratio represents the total benefits of a project divided by the total
costs. In principle, the higher the ratio, the more beneficial the project. A ratio of one results
from a project which would just break even. The social discount rate is that rate at which one
assumes a future dollar will be worth less than today's. A lower discount rate therefore represents a more optimistic view of the economic future.
71. Naff & Matson, supra note 9, at 45.
72. Cooley, supra note 47, at 19.
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United States financing, during the late 1970s. In the mid-1970s, water
rationing in large cities like Amman and Irbid pointed to the need for a
major water project. The 1975 'seven year plan' included 'Stage II'-the
revived concept of a large (486 MCM storage) dam on the Yarmuk at
Maqarin. The dam would store winter runoff to provide irrigation water
to the Jordan Valley, 20 MW of hydropower, and a more even downstream
baseflow year-round. The total cost of the project, as estimated in 1979,
73
was $1 billion.
The Carter administration became interested in the plan and in
1980, pledged a $9 million USAID loan for development in addition to $10
million which had previously been allocated. Also in 1980, Congress committed $150 million over three years to the plan with one condition- that
Israel, Jordan and Syria resolve their riparian problems before funds
would be appropriated.
The dam would straddle the Syria-Jordan border and relations
between those countries had been deteriorating throughout the 1970s.
Downstream, Israel asked for an increase in its Yarmuk allotment from 23
MCM/yr. to 40 MCM/yr. as well as an additional 140 MCM/yr. for the
West Bank. 74 Johnston Plan allocations for the Yarmuk included 25 MCM/
yr. for Israel and 70 MCM/yr. to the West Bank. U.S. mediation efforts led
by Philip Habib in 1980 proved fruitless with no two of the parties reaching agreement. The plan was indefinitely postponed late that year, but has
very recently been revived by Jordan and Syria as the 'Unity Dam.'
In 1977, Jordanian water officials approached their Israeli counterparts through United States intermediaries and requested a high level
meeting to discuss rebuilding the low dam at Mukheiba, the northern side
of which would have abutted Israeli territory. One meeting was held that
year in a European hotel with three ministerial-level representatives from
each side present. Israeli representatives expressed approval of the dama more even year-round flow would benefit both sides-and agreed to
further discussion on this and other regional water planning issues. 75 In
elections that year, however, the Israeli government shifted from Labor- to
Likud-led for the first time, and the new ministers did not pursue the dialog with the Jordanians. Direct ministerial negotiations were not held
again on water issues, although the 'Picnic Table Talks' on allocations of
the Yarmuk River continued at the technical level.
More serious water related conflict almost did break out in this
same area during this period. In July of the drought year 1979, Jordan
sought American mediation to gain Israeli permission to service the intake
of the East Ghor Canal, which had been silting up. Days after having
73. Taubenblatt, supra note 23, at 48.
74. Davis et al., supranote 46, at 11; S. Kahhaleh, The Water Problem in Israel and Its Repercussion on the Arab-Israeli Conflict 46 (1981).
75. Minutes from meeting on May 6,1977.
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cleared the intake, Jordan charged the Israelis with replacing the rocks so
more water would flow downstream and brought military forces up to the
cease-fire line. The Israelis responded by mobilizing its own forces in the
area. An armed conflict was averted only with urgent American mediation.
Meanwhile, tensions were being somewhat reduced along other
borders. In 1978, Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David peace accordsthe first between Israel and an Arab country. At a September 1979 meeting
with Israeli editors, President Anwar Sadat discussed plans for a pipeline
to bring Nile water to the recently returned Sinai Peninsula. "Once we
bring them to Sinai," he asked, "why should we not bring some of this
water to the Negev?" 76 The offer was reiterated and elaborated upon in
discussions with Prime Minister Menachem Begin in 1981. Israel would be
provided with 365 MCM/yr. in exchange for "solution of the Palestinian
problem and the liberation of Jerusalem." 77
The offer was immediately rejected by almost all parties concerned. Prime Minister Begin objected to the quid pro quo, stressing that
Israel would not trade its sovereignty over a unified Jerusalem for economic gain. Nationalists on both sides were also opposed to the ideaEgyptians did not want to share this vital resource with Israel, and Israelis
did not like the idea of being vulnerable to upstream control. Israeli Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon is quoted as saying, "I would hate to be in a
situation in which the Egyptians could close our taps whenever they
wished." 78
Interestingly, the most virulent opposition to the offer came from
another region entirely. Ethiopia, 2500 kilometers upriver, charged that
Egypt was misusing its share of Nile water. In a sharp retort, President
Sadat warned against Ethiopian action:
We do not need permission from Ethiopia or the Soviet
Union to divert our Nile water.... If Ethiopia takes any
action to block the Nile waters, there will be no alternative for us but to use force. Tampering with the rights
of a nation to water is tampering with its life and a
decision to go to war on this
score is indisputable in the
79
international community.
In 1981, President Sadat was assassinated. The plan was never
implemented except for a small irrigation diversion into the western Sinai.

76. L. Spector and G,Gruen, American Jewish Committee, Waters of Controversy: Implications for the Arab-Israel Peace Process 10 (1980).
77. R. Krishna, The Legal Regime of the Nile River Basin, in The Politics of Scarcity: Water in
the Middle East, supra note 9, at 32.
78. Spector & Gruen, supranote 76, at 10.
79. Krishna, supranote 77, at 33-34.
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In 1982, Israel, for the second time, mounted an operation against
the PLO in Lebanon. The first time, 'Operation Litani' four years earlier,
Israel had stopped its advance at the Litani River and, before withdrawing, had turned over portions of Southern Lebanon to the South Lebanon
Army under the command of Major Sa'ad Haddad. Haddad was to protect Israeli interests in the region, particularly defending against
attempted Palestinian incursions through the area to Israel. In addition,
the militia is reported to have protected the Jordan headwaters of the Hasbani by closing some local wells and preventing the digging of others. As
a result, some or all of the 35 MCM allocated to Lebanon in the Johnston
Plan now flows to Israel.80 In the 1982 operation, the Litani was again the
initially stated objective but by July, Israeli forces had surrounded Beirut.
This war, like the 1967 war, had clear military and political objectives.
And, like the 1967 war, this war may have had a hydraulic component-a
major one according to some analysts-shaping some of the strategic decisionmaking.8 1
The Litani River has a natural flow of about 700 MCM/yr. A dam
at Qirawn in the Beka'a Valley and irrigation and hydropower diversions
completed in the mid-1960s reduce the lower Litani flow to around 100
MCM/yr.82 It is this lower section, flowing within kilometers of the Hasbani and the Israeli border, which historically had presented the possibilities of diversions in conjunction with the Jordan system. The Israeli Cotton
Plan and the Arab Headwaters Diversion Plan envisioned water diverted
into and out of the Jordan basin, respectively.' In fact, even before 1982,
intelligence reports to deterIsrael had carried out seismic studies and
83
mine the feasibility of a Litani diversion.
After the invasion was launched by then Defense Minister Ariel
Sharon, a 'water hawk' who had frequently spoken of seizing the Litani,
Israel captured the Qirawn Dam and immediately confiscated all hydroand technical documents relating to the Litani and its
graphic charts
84
installations.
During the years of Israeli occupation from 1982 to 1985, several
analysts developed and elaborated on a 'hydraulic imperative' theory
which described water as the motivator for Israeli conquests, both
recently, in Lebanon, and earlier, in the West Bank and Golan Heights. The
speculations for likely Israeli actions in Lebanon by proponents of this theory ranged from a simple diversion of the 100 MCM/yr. available at the
lower Litani to elaborate conjectures of a permanent occupation of the
entire Beka'a Valley south of the Beirut-Damascus Highway which, along
with a hypothetical destruction of the Qirawn dam and Marhaba diver80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Naff & Matson, supranote 9, at 49.
Id.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 76.
Cooley, supra note 47, at 22.
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sion tunnel and forced depopulation of southern Lebanon, would
allow
85
diversion of the entire 700 MCM/yr. flow of the river into Israel.
This 'hydraulic imperative' theory has been critiqued on political,
technical and economic grounds, 86 but the strongest rebuttal, at least with
regards to Lebanon, comes from the fact that, despite method, more than
eight years of opportunity, and, given a serious drought since the mid1980s-ample motive-the Israelis are not now diverting the Litani River,
87
and the issue was not raised during troop withdrawal negotiations.
However, the 'Security Zone' which Israel retains since its withdrawal still
does include the most likely diversion point at Taibeih. Further, former
Technology Minister Yuval Ne'eman has mentioned in the past that, if the
Lebanese ever cared to sell some of the Litani
waters, "we could make
88
good use of them in the Northern Galilee."
D. 1982-Present
Since the 1973 war the regional conflict focus has shifted from
being Israeli-Arab to Israeli-Palestinian. This is true regarding water conflicts as well. In fact, while earlier periods were marked by major water
projects and regionwide water conflicts, this most recent period has
mostly been one of internal posturing within each state to optimize existing water resources. Israeli maneuvering, however, also includes territory
and populations under military occupation, whose final status has yet to
be determined. Because of the hydrography of these areas, the focus has
also shifted from a surface water to a groundwater conflict.
As mentioned earlier, Israel took control of the West Bank in 1967,
including the recharge areas for aquifers which flow west and northwest
into Israel (at about 335 MCM/yr. and 140 MCM/yr. respectively) and
east to the Jordan Valley (about 125 MCM/yr.) 89 The entire renewable
recharge of these first two aquifers is already being exploited and the third
is close to being depleted as well. Because any overdraft would result in
saltwater intrusion along Israel's coastal plain, or eventually even into the
mountain aquifers, Palestinian water usage has been severely limited by
the Israeli authorities.
85. Proponents of a 'hydraulic imperative theory' include J. Cooley, see supra note 47; U.
Davis, see supranote 46; S. Kahhaleh, see supra note 74; T. Stauffer, The Priceof Peace:The Spoils
of War, 1 Arab-American Affairs 43 (1982); and J. Stork, Water and Israel's Occupation Strategy,
116 Merip Reports 19 (1983). This last, most extreme scenario is described in detail in Stauffer,
supra.
86. See Naff & Matson, supra note 9, at 75-80 (discussing political and technical weaknesses of the theory); Wishart, supra note 14 (providing an economic critique). Even though
the imperative has been fairly well discredited, Naff and Matson, in one of the more thorough
analyses, do note that "although water may not have been the prime impetus behind the
Israeli acquisition of territory, as the 'hydraulic imperative' alleges, it seems to be perhaps the
main factor determining its retention of that territory." Id.
87. Cooley, supra note 47, at 25.
88. Id.
89. Kahan, supra note 17, at 21.
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In 26 years of occupation, a growing West Bank population, augmented by the proliferation of Jewish settlements, has increased the burden on the limited water supply, resulting in an exacerbation of already
tense political relations. Palestinians have objected strenuously to Israeli
control of local water resources and to settlement development, which
they see is at their territorial and hydrologic expense.
In 1967, Israel nationalized all West Bank water and limits were
placed on the amount withdrawn from each existing well. Since then, only
five permits have been granted to Palestinians, and those only for domestic needs. Agricultural use was capped at 1968 levels and all subsequent
90
extension of land under irrigation has been through increased efficiency.
At the same time, 17 wells were drilled to provide water to the new Israeli
settlements. Some Palestinian wells were undercut and desiccated, notably at al-Auja and Bardala, because of the deeper, more powerful Israeli
wells.9 1 Of the 47 MCM/yr. pumped in the mountain area, 14 MCM/yr.,
or 30 percent, goes to the Jewish settlements. The eastern aquifer, which
flows into the Jordan Valley, is the only one not being overexploited, but
not been allowed to expand their water resources in this
Palestinians have
92
region either.
Israelis argue that Palestinian agriculture can expand using water
saved through more efficient agricultural practices. For example, modem
methods of fertilization have helped Palestinian farmers in the Jifflik valproduction tenfold without significantly increasing
ley increase vegetable
93
needs.
water
One factor exacerbating tensions between the sides is that legal
ownership of water originating on the West Bank, and consequent drilling
rights, is still under dispute. Under pre-1967 Jordanian law, water on the
West Bank had been considered a private resource and, although approval
for any irrigation schemes was required from the Department of Irrigation
and Water, permission was routinely granted.94 Under the law, each landowner in the West Bank had the right to drill a well on his land, although
the government had final authority to distribute permits and to determine
pumping limits and allocations.
After the 1967 war, one of the first Israeli Military Orders enacted
was one necessitating permission from an area commander to operate a
water installation.9 5 The following year, Military Order 291 brought all
90. J. Richardson, The West Bank: A Portrait 122 (1984).
91. Dillman, supranote 30, at 56-57. It should be noted that, despite repeated reference to
these two examples of desiccation in the literature, new water sources have been supplied by
the Israelis for both of these areas. For details, see Info Briefing, Israel's Water System and
Problems 4 (1986); and Stork, supra note 85, at 22.
92. Dillman, supra note 30, at 57.
93. D. Rymon & U. Or,Advanced Technologies in Traditional Agriculture (ATTA): A New
Approach (1989) (unpublished manuscript).
94. Dillman, supra note 30, at 52.
95. Id. at 53 (quoting Military Order 158, Article 4 (A)).
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surface and groundwater under public ownership to be managed by
Israeli water authorities in conjunction with the Israeli hydrologic network. 96 Technically, Israeli authorities did not significantly alter the structure of groundwater law in the territories, retaining the wording of
Jordanian law but transferring final authority from the Kingdom of Jordan
to the Israeli military administration. In practice, though, day-to-day
operations became increasingly controlled by the Israeli Water Commissioner's office to the point where, today, almost all water is metered, limited, priced, and allocated by that body.
Israeli authorities viewed these actions as defensive actions, of a
sort. Hydrogeologically, Israel is down-gradient of the West Bank aquifers. In essence, groundwater flows, albeit extremely slowly,97 from the
recharge areas and upland aquifers of the West Bank down to those on the
Israeli coast on its way to the sea. The Israelis had been tapping up to 270
MCM/yr. of this groundwater from its side of the Green Line since 1955.98
Any uncontrolled, extensive groundwater development in the newly
occupied territories would threaten these coastal
wells with saltwater
99
intrusion from the sea, causing serious damage.
With one-third of Israeli water coming from the West Bank, the
Israelis perceive the necessity to limit groundwater exploitation in these
territories in order to protect the resources themselves and the coastal
wells from saltwater intrusion. To this end, they have even imported surface water from the National Water Carrier to the Ramallah and Hebron
hill region for Arab domestic use rather than allowing additional drill10
ing. 0Palestinians have objected to this increasing control and integration into the Israeli grid. Legal arguments often refer, at least in part, to the
Fourth Geneva Convention's discussion of territories under military occupation.10 1 In principle, it is argued, the resources of occupied territory cannot be exported to the benefit of the occupying power. Israeli authorities
reject these arguments, usually claiming that the Convention is not applicable to the West Bank or Gaza because the powers these territories were
wrested from were not, themselves, legitimate rulers.10 2 Egypt was itself a
military occupier of Gaza and only Britain and Pakistan recognized Jordan's 1950 annexation of the West Bank. Also, it is pointed out that the
96. Id. at 52.
97. R. Freeze and J. Cherry give an estimate of 3 cm/yr. to 30 m/yr. as a likely range for
the fractured limestones and sandstones which would make up these aquifers. See R. Freeze

& J.Cherry, Groundwater (1979).
98. Garbell, supra note 14,at 30.
99. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, supra note 8, at 200.
100. Spector & Gruen, supra note 76, at 10.
101. See, e.g. Dillman, supranote 30; J EI-Hindi, Note: The West Bank Aquifer and Conventions
Regarding Laws of Belligerent Occupation, 11 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1400 (1990).
102. Y.Blum, The Missing Reversionary: Reflections on the Status of Judeaand Samaria,3 Israeli
L. Rev. (1968); El-Hindi, supra note 101.
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water Israel uses is not being exported but rather flows naturally seaward,
and, because Israel has been pumping that water since 1955, it has 'prior
appropriation' ("first in time, first in right") rights to the water.
Although Jordan gave up all claims to the West Bank in 1988 in
favor of the 'State of Palestine,' Jordanian water from the Yarmuk is still
the most likely source of surface water for the area, with Jordan still
'owing' the West Bank 70-150 MCM/yr. from the Johnston proposals.
During the Maqarin Dam negotiations and since, the Israelis have urged
construction of the project and the sharing of water resources with the
Israel, "in the context of regional agreement
West Bank, and, naturally,
10 3
and cooperation."
It is clear that Israel would hope to keep control over water usage
in the West Bank even in the event of Palestinian autonomy. When talks
were held under the auspices of Camp David, the Israeli Committee determined that,
the water resources of the State of Israel inside the
Green Line originate in the West Bank and that incorrect application of drilling in the West Bank could
salinize the water reservoirs of the State of Israel ....
The State of Israel must continue to control the water
resources in the territories, both because of the danger
to water reserve inside the Green Line and because
to establish new
[otherwise] it would be impossible
104
settlements in these territories.
Although this position softened somewhat with negotiations
until, in 1980, Israel proposed a joint water committee of Israeli and Palestinian representatives, they made it very clear that, "all decisions would
have to be unanimous.'10
Eventually, the final status of this region will have to be determined. Aside from politics or nationalisms, hydrologic reasoning would
seem to dictate that this determination be done sooner rather than later. As
one U.N. report notes,
The present integration of the basic water services in
the occupied territories with those of Israel is about to
lead to the complete dependence of the former services
on those of Israel and will eventually make the separation of the two very costly and difficult. 1°6

103. Richardson, supranote 90, at 122 (quoting Coordinator of Government Operations in
Judea and Samaria).
104. Davis, supra note 46, at 4 (quoting the Israeli Committee).
105. Spector & Gruen, supra note 76, at 11.
106. Dillman, supranote 30, at 63 (quoting U.N. Report).
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E. Historic Synopsis
It should be kept firmly in mind that none of the events described
above in this historical section happened in a political vacuum. Of all the
myriad of geopolitical and strategic forces surrounding each of these
events, only those relating water resources to conflict or negotiations were
extracted for examination. However, in an analysis of this sort, one must
be careful of overzealous reductionism. It is not being suggested that
water is the prime motivator in the history of the people of the Jordan
River watershed, nor even that water, of itself, has been the cause of conflict. The contention is only as follows:
- That water, as a strategic resource, has played a larger role in
regional conflict than is generally known;
That water issues have precipitated some conflict and added
to existing tensions in the region;
And that, occasionally, water issues have led to dialogue and
attempts at cooperation.
If one accepts that conflict can come about in part because of
scarce water resources, and understands that as populations and economies continue to grow against hydrologic limits, so do the dangers, the
logical question is, "What's to be done?" The following section offers a
brief survey of some technical and management options for the future.

TECHNOLOGIC AND MANAGEMENT
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE
There is an entire array of solutions to water resource limits ranging from agricultural to technological to economic and public policy, but
they all fall under the same two basic categories as for any resource shortage: increase supply or decrease demand. Allowances must also be made
for anticipated shifts in climate and demographics. General recommendations for the future are also included.
A. Increasing Supply
1) New Natural Sources
No new 'rivers' will be discovered in the Mideast, but increased
catchment of winter floodwater anywhere along the existing river system
can add just as well to the water budget. This applies to small wadis as
well as to large storage projects such as the Maqarin Dam, which alone
could contribute a savings of about 330 MCM/yr. When it is possible to
store water underground through artificial groundwater recharge, even
more water is saved-that not lost to evaporation in a surface reservoir.
Less evaporation also means less of a salinity problem in the remaining
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water. Israel currently stores 200 MCM/yr. from its National Water Carrier project in this method.1 07
Underground is the only place to look for any real new water supplies. In 1985, Israel confirmed the discovery of a large fossil aquifer in the
Nubian sandstone underlying the Sinai and Negev Deserts. Israel is
already exploiting 25 MCM/yr. from this source and is investigating the
possibility of pumping 300 MCM/yr. in the coming century. 10 8 Jordan has
also been carrying out a systematic groundwater evaluation project in
recent years with the help of USAID and the United States Geological Survey.

109

Any other source would come at the expense of another watershed. Despite this, at one time or another, Israel has eyed the Litani and
the Nile, Jordan has looked to the Euphrates, and all of the countries in the
area have been intrigued by the 'Peace Pipeline,' proposed by Turkey in
1987. The western line of this project would deliver 1200 MCM/yr. from
110
the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers to Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
Despite Prime Minister Ozal's belief that, "by pooling regional resources,
the political tensions in the area can be diffused,"1 11 at a cost of $20 billion,
this project probably won't be diffusing tensions in the very near future.
2) New Sources Through Technology
Projects like iceberg towing and cloud-seeding, though appealing
to the imagination, do not seem to be the most likely direction for future
technology. The former involves great expense and the latter can be, at
best, a small part of a very local solution. Although a representative of
Israel's water authority claims that 15 percent of Israeli annual rainfall is
due to their cloud-seeding program 1 this has been documented only
within the northern Galilee catchment and results seem not to have the
consistency necessary for reliable planning.
The two most likely technologies to increase water supply for the
future are desalination and wastewater reclamation. The Mideast has
already spent more on desalting plants than any other part of the world.
The region has 35 percent of the world's plants with 65 percent of the total
desalting capacity, mostly along the Arabian peninsula. 113 Israel, too,
included plans for both conventional and nuclear desalination plants in its
107. R. Ambroggi, UndergroundReservoirs to Control the Water Cycle, 236 Scientific American 104, 110 (1985).
108. A. Issar, Fossil Water Under the Sinai-Negev Peninsula, 253 Scientific American 104, 110
(1985).
109. Starr & Stoll, supranote 2, at 32.
110. C. Duna, Turkey's Peace Pipelinein The Politics of Scarcity: Water in the Middle East,
supranote 9, at 119.
111. Id. at 121 (quoting Prime Minister Ozal).
112. J. Siegal, The World's Best Rainmaker, Jerusalem Post, April 8,1989, at 12.
113. E. Anderson, Water: The Next Strategic Resource in The Politics of Scarcity: Water in the
Middle East, supra note 9, at 4.
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water planning until 1978, when they were114abandoned as "technologically
premature and economically unfeasible."
It is this problem of cost that makes desalinated water impractical
for most applications. Although drinking water is a completely inelastic
good-that is, people will pay almost any price for it-water for agriculture, by far the largest use in the Mideast, has to be cost-effective enough
so that the agricultural end product remains competitive in the marketplace. The present costs of about $.80 to $1.50 per cubic meter to desalt seawater and about $.30/m 3 for brackish water1 1 5 do not make this
technology an economic water source for most uses. Efforts are being
made, however, to lower these costs through multiple use plants (getting
desalted water as a by-product in a plant designed primarily for energy
generation), increased energy efficiency in plant design, and by augmenting conventional plant power with solar or other energy sources.
One additional use of saltwater is to mix it with freshwater in just
the quantity to leave it useful for agricultural or industrial purposes, effectively adding to the freshwater supply. This method was used116in Israel in
the 1975-76 season to add 141 MCM/yr. to the water budget.
The other promising technology to increase supply is wastewater
reclamation. Two plants in Israel currently treat 110 MCM/yr. or 40 percent of the country's sewage for re-use, and projections call for treating 80
percent by the end of the decade. 117 The treated water is currently used to
irrigate some 15,000 hectares-mostly cotton.11 8 It is anticipated that full
exploitation of purified wastewater will eventually constitute 45 percent
of domestic water needs. 11 9 This type of project could be developed
throughout the region (a World Bank loan helped finance the Israeli
project). The obvious limit of this technology is the amount of wastewater
generated by a population in a year.
B. Decreasing Demand
The guiding principle to decrease demand for any scarce resource
should be, "Can it be used more efficiently?" This does not always work,
however, especially when there is an emotional value associated either
with the resource itself or with the proposed solution. Unfortunately,
when dealing with water, emotions usually charge both aspects of the
issue. For example, the most direct way to cut demand for Mideast water
is to limit population growth in the region. However, in an area where
each national group and religious and ethnic subgroup all seem to be
114. I.Galnoor, Water Policymaking in Israel, 4 Pol'y Analysis 339, 352 (1978).
115. L. Awerbuch, DesalinationTechnology: An Overview, in The Politics of Scarcity: Water in
the Middle East, supra note 9, at 59.
116. Kahhaleh, supra note 74, at 40.
117. Environmental Protection Service, supra note 15, at 8.
118. S.Postel, Waterfor Agriculture:Facingthe Limits, Worldwatch 39,42 (1989).
119. Environmental Protection Service, supra note 15, at 147.
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locked in some demographic race for numerical superiority, this is not
very likely to occur. Many of the sectors most susceptible to efficient
restructuring are also those most laden with emotion.
1) Agricultural Sector
Some aspects of decreasing agricultural water demand are noncontroversial and have made the region a showcase for arid-agriculture
water conservation. Technologic advances like drip-irrigation and microsprinklers, which reduce water loss by evaporation are about 20-50 percent more efficient than standard sprinklers and tremendously more 120
so
than the open-ditch flood method used in the region for centuries.
Computerized control systems, working in conjunction with direct soil
moisture measurements can add even more precision to crop irrigation.
Other water savings have come through bioengineered crops
which exist on a minimal amount of freshwater,
on brackish water, or even
121
on the direct application of saltwater.
As a result of using a combination of these conservation methods,
Israel's irrigated area has gone from 172 million hectares in 1973 to 220
million hectares in 1988, with total production increasing by 100 percent,
while water consumption for agriculture remained nearly constant. 122 It
has been speculated that the irrigated area in the West Bank could likewise
be doubled without increasing the demand for water. 123 Meanwhile these
techniques have been spreading throughout the region, and it is reasonable to assume that increased water efficiency will continue to be an
important aspect of Mideast agriculture.
Encouraging cooperation in research and development between
the countries in the region, possibly in cooperation with other areas facing
similar problems like the arid southwestern United States, can help with
this diffusion of technology. Some such programs exist,124 but they usually exclude pairing any two countries with hostile relations, creating a
serious technologic barrier precisely where the free flow of information is
most important.
Emotional charge enters into the water debate only when it is suggested by economists or planners that greater hydrologic efficiency might
be gained if less water were used in agriculture in general.

120. Id. at 144.
121. For interesting examples of direct seawater irrigation, see C. Hodges, et al., Direct Seawater Irrigationas a Major Food ProductionTechnologyfor the Middle East, in The Politics of Scarcity: Water in the Middle East, supranote 9, at 109-118.
122. Environmental Protection Service, supra note 15, at 144.
123. M. Heller, A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel 130 (1983).
124. For a good description of U.S. involvement, see Starr & Stoll, supra note 2.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

2) Economic Water Efficiency
Water distribution in the Mideast is so riddled with economic
inefficiency that an economist approaching it must feel very much like a
designer of drip irrigation watching a field being flood-irrigated. The
main problem is that the cost of water to the user is highly subsidized,
especially water earmarked for agriculture. The true cost of water would
reflect all of the pumping, treatment and delivery costs of that water, most
of which are not passed on to the farmers. In Israel alone, 20 percent of the
country's5 energy is used solely to move water from one place to
12
another.
Economic theory argues that, only when the price paid for a commodity is a reasonable reflection of the true price can market forces work
for efficient distribution of the commodity.126 In other words, subsidized
water leads to waste in agricultural practices, too little incentive for
research and development of conservation techniques and practice, and,
finally, too much water being allocated to the agricultural sector as
opposed to industry. Take away subsidies and allow the price to rise, it is
argued, and market incentives are created for both greater efficiency on
the farm and a natural shift of water resources from the agricultural sector
to industry, where contribution to GNP per unit of water is often much
higher.12 7 Since in each of the areas discussed between 75 and 95 percent
of water use is allocated for agriculture, the savings could be substantial.
Economic analysis may also create a framework for easing
regional water tensions. "Put simply, conflicts over water rights are easier
to resolve if transaction costs of resolution are lower, and if opportunities
exist for improving the efficiency of water use and discovery. 8 In other
words, if it is cheaper for people to cooperate and save water than it is to
fight, they would rather cooperate.
There are, however, problems inherent in using economic theory
as the tool for water conflict analysis-problems which can lead to weaknesses in the economic solutions prescribed. First, water is not a pure economic good. Options to the consumer of most goods include migrating to
where it is cheaper if so desired or abstaining from it altogether if the price
is too high. Given small countries with tightly controlled borders, the
former is not a viable alternative, nor, for more obvious biologic reasons, is
the latter. Presumably, though, the analysis is restricted to water for agriculture where there is ample room for reducing demand before running
into such dangers.
The second problem is more serious because it has to do with a
force much more fundamental than economic theory-that is, the emo125. Naff & Matson, supra note 9, at 12.
126. See Wishart, supra note 14 (providing a good economic analysis of Jordan River

water).
127. Id. at 49.
128. Id. at 50.
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tions of a nation. All of the countries in the area were built from the farm
up and the agriculturalist, whether thefellah or the kibbutznik, holds a special mystique on both sides of the Jordan. Both Arabic and Hebrew ideologies are rife with slogans of 'making the desert bloom' and 'nations
rooted in their land.' In this context, water invariably becomes the 'life
blood' of a nation. One result of this has been a certain leeway granted to
agriculture in the area, both political and financial.
One striking example of water 'diseconomy' is the case of Israeli
settlements on the Golan Heights. The 24, mostly agricultural, settlements
of the Golan have a population of about 3500. In 1980, approximately 80
percent of the 50 MCM/yr. used by these settlements waspumped up
from Lake Kinneret -a height differential of 600 meters. 129 Each cubic
meter of water weighs a metric ton. Were the settlers to include the costs of
the energy required to lift that much water that high, their crops could not
possibly be competitive in the marketplace. But settlements on the Golan
Heights are viewed as more than a source of agricultural production. They
are also outposts, whose very presence creates a kind of first line of
defense against the Syrians, whom many Israelis view as the likely antagonist in a next war.
This perceived connection between settlements and security
holds true throughout the country. As Frey and Naff write, "Israeli agriculture is not merely an ordinary economic sector. It is linked to the crucial
matter of settlements, and settlements are linked to defense and national
security." 130 This, then, is what makes Golan cotton competitive in the
eyes of the nation.
Overlooking this fundamental aspect of a 'national water ethic' of
any of the countries involved can occasionally confound an economist,
especially one from outside of the region. Cal Burwell, once the director of
research for the proposed Agro-Industrial complex, mentioned recently
that, "Some of what's valuable to the folks over
there just doesn't fit into
31
what our folks would call 'good economics.' ,1
Even while recognizing its limits, one can still use economic analysis as a useful tool to provide some guidelines to increase hydrologic efficiency. And it has been suggested that following these guidelines can be
especially crucial, particularly as water limits begin to be reached:
Whereas diseconomies dictated by ideology could be
tolerated under conditions of conventional water sufficiency, they cannot continue indefinitely, especially
with regard to 132
investments under conditions of system's shortage.
129. Davis et al., supra note 46, at 27; Inbar & Maos, supra note 14, at 22.
130. Frey & Naff, supra note 3, at 76.
131. Telephone Interview with Cal Burwell,,former Director of Research for proposed
Agro-Industrial Complex, on February 8, 1990.
132. Galnorr, supra note 114, at 360.
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3) Public Policy
Where the 'invisible hand' of economic forces fails to guide a
more efficient water use, the more authoritative guidelines of public policy can take over. Government agencies could, after all, simply implement
one analyst's prescription of cutting water to agriculture by 35 percent if
they wished. - 3 The 'if they wished' is the problem. The same national
water ethics that give agriculture great economic clout in the region also
give it great political clout. The Water Commission in Israel, for example,
is the ultimate authority for all water planning and operations in the country. It, in turn, is controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture. Clearly there is
room for improvement even in terms of national public policy. But the real
opportunities come from the international policy sector.
Water policy in this region is presently drawn up within the
boundaries of a nation, rather than within those of a watershed. Because
the flow of water does not respect the political boundaries, it should be
clear that regional management, at the watershed level at least, would be
a much more efficient approach. In fact, the only point on which the water
policy analyses surveyed here do agree is on the need for planned water
sharing and joint water development, as Eric Johnston envisioned 35
years ago.
Regional cooperation would open the door to a host of new water
distribution alternatives. 134 For example, surface water from the Yarmuk
or the upper Jordan could be provided to the West Bank, allowing
increased development in that area while alleviating Israeli fears of overdrafted Palestinian wells. Or, Israel and Jordan might cooperatively
develop both banks of the Jordan, eliminating the current redundant costs
of separate delivery systems within each country. And, the larger the
region cooperating, the more efficient a regional plan can be developed. It
is cheaper, for example, to bring water from the Nile to the Negev than it
135
is to pump it from the Kinneret, as is the current practice.
It has been argued that one need not wait for the cessation of hostilities before developing such water sharing plans:
A regional water plan need not await the achievement
of peace. To the contrary, its preparation, before a comprehensive peace settlement is attained, could help
13
clarify objectives to be aimed for in achieving peace. 6

133. Professor Thomas Naff, Lecture at University of Wisconsin (Madison) (March 28,
1990).
134. Most of the following projects are described in detail in E.Kally, The Potentialfor Cooperationin Water Projectsin the Middle East at Peace,in Economic Cooperation in the Middle East
(G. Fishelson ed., 1989).
135. Id. at 305.
136. H. Ben-Sharar, Economic Cooperationin the Middle East: From Dream to Reality, in Economic Cooperation in the Middle East, supra note 134.
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It should be clear that any dreams of regional cooperation in the
Mideast run at least the same dangers of confronting issues of deep
national emotion as economic solutions do -probably even more. Listing
all of the reasons that regional cooperation may not work in the Mideast is
certainly well beyond the scope of this paper. But one question is particularly relevant to the proposal of joint water projects and deserves mention.
Despite one author's contention that, "the successful implementation of cooperative projects ... will strengthen and stabilize peace," 137 this
does not necessarily seem to be the case. It seems at this point inconclusive
whether greater interdependence is actually an impetus to greater cooperation or is, in fact, the opposite, leading to greater conflict. Many of the
hostilities that have occurred in the region over water seem to have come
about precisely because the water destined to a downstream user was controlled by an upstream party. Many 'cooperative' projects might only provide additional opportunity for suspicion and potential for contention.
Lowi suggests that issues of regional water sharing cannot be successfully
broached138
until the larger political issues of territory and refugees are
resolved.
However, the fact that projects would have to be weighed in terms
of the conflict-alleviating tendencies of more efficient water distribution as
opposed to the possibly conflict heightening of greater hydrologic interdependence should not be a reason to abandon the concept. Nor, by any
means, should the concept of a regional planning approach be tarnished
because of uncertainty about specific projects.
C. Climatic and Demographic Shifts
It should be emphasized that an analysis of such a fragile 'hydropolitical' situation as exists in the Mideast is actually more complicated
than so far discussed. This is so because so few of the parameters which
are examined remain stable for any length of time. Aside from the volatile
nature of politics in general, and Mideast politics specifically, two other
factors complicate the present precarious situation-one climatic and one
demographic.
Many climatologists are currently investigating what changes
will occur in regional weather patterns given an anticipated rise in average global temperature. One possible climatic scenario is a northward
shift in the distribution of winter rainfall, away from the Jordan Basin. Difficult though they are to predict on a regional scale, the effects of shifting
annual precipitation patterns in the Mideast could have profound impacts
on the politics of the region, depending on how dramatic the changes are
which actually develop. As global, and finally regional, modeling and
137. Kally, supra note 134, at 325.
138. M. Lowi, The Politics of Water Under Conditions of Scarcity and Conflict: The Jordan
River and Riparian States (1990)(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

forecasting improve, this subject will have to be investigated further in
order for appropriate planning measures to be taken.
A second, more imminent, change is already beginning to occur in
the region which could dramatically affect issues of water distribution
and usage. Israel expects at least a million Soviet immigrants in the coming decade, possibly two million.139 Jordan is absorbing 300,000 Palestinians who left Kuwait in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Furthermore, if
political negotiations were to result in an autonomous Palestine on the
West Bank, that entity might absorb a percentage of the 2.2 million Palestinians registered worldwide as refugees. 140 Based on current consumption, Israel would require an additional 94 MCM/yr., or a little over five
percent of their current water budget, just to provide for personal use for
one million immigrants. Jordan would need 17.5 MCM/yr. additional
supply for its refugees, and the West Bank would need an additional 25
MCM/yr., or a 23 percent increase in its water141
budget, to provide for the
personal water needs of a million immigrants.
Admittedly, these numbers represent simple extrapolations based
on current use. However, given that hydrologic limits are not only presently being reached but annual supplies are routinely being surpassed,
questions as to the absorptive capacity of the region's water resources for
immigrants and refugees should at least be asked.
D. Recommendations
The inextricable link between water and politics suggest several
options for easing regional water tensions:
A) Efficiency of water use should be enhanced as much as is
politically, economically, and technologically possible.
Increased efficiency should strive for:
regional water resource planning on, at a minimum, the
watershed scale. In the case of the Jordan River, representatives from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, and the West
Bank, should be working together on watershed management planning. For greater efficiency, the geographic scale
of planning could be increased. Planning options multiply
as the scale considered and the sources of water resources
increase. Allowances should be made for changes in climate and demographics.
increased economic efficiency through a shift of water used
from agricultural to industrial sectors. Although some rec139. Soviet Jews, Arab Fearsand Israel, supranote 7.
140. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, supranote 8, at 206.
141. All of the numbers provided here are direct extrapolations of the data provided in the
section of this paper entitled Current Water Use. For example, Israel has a total annual water
budget of 1800 MCM/yr., of which 22 percent is domestic consumption, and a domestic use.
Allocating this usage to one million immigrants gives the reported 94 MCM/yr.
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ommend a shift of as much as 35-40 percent,142 it should be
remembered that the states involved have security concerns which may preclude becoming major food importers,
even if it is more economical to do so. These concerns
should be weighed when determining how much of a shift
is warranted.
increased support for research and development of watersaving technology. This should include small-scale applications, such as low-flow shower nozzles and toilets, and
larger-scale projects, like sequential re-use and wastewater
treatment, for the agricultural and industrial sectors. The
Maqarin Dam should finally be built. Special emphasis
might be placed on desalination technology, again both
small- and large-scale. A regional desalination project,
based on the goals of the Agro-industrial Complex but
using a combination of solar, natural gas and hydropower
many of
rather than nuclear, might be implemented with143
the regional benefits foreseen in the original plan.
B) Issues of water scarcity must be incorporated into any
regional political negotiations in order for a resulting agreement to be viable in the long term. This is particularly true of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict where any separation of the two
entities provides intricate problems of hydrologic viability for
both parties.
Third parties like the United States, Russia, and the European
Community have vital roles to play in any of these strategies. Information
barriers can be more easily broken down on neutral territory Funding for
cooperative projects will probably have to be raised outside of the region.
And, opportunities for dialogue will have to be provided and encouraged.
the United
Starr and Stoll provide detailed recommendations for how
144
States could and should become involved in these issues.
-

CONCLUSION
In 1876, John Wesley Powell, the leader of the first organized
expedition down the Colorado River, submitted his Report on the Lands of
the Arid Region of the United States to Congress. Among his observations on
142. Lecture by Professor Thomas Naff, supra note 133.
143. For the past decade, the Israelis have sought to build a canal from the Mediterranean
Sea which would provide 800 MW of hydropower by dropping 800 MCM/yr of saltwater
400 meters at the Dead Sea, the lowest point on earth. Such a Med-Dead Canal would also
make possible power generation in 'solar ponds,' a new technology which takes advantage
of heat trapped in the lower level of water of two distinct salinities (Dead Sea water is seven
times more saline that that of the Mediterranean) . If the focus of the canal project became
desalination, rather than strictly power generation, and if Negev and Sinai land were to be
set aside for reclamation, many of the regional benefits for immigrant/refugee absorption
and for political cooperation of the Agro-industrial Complex might be realized.
144. Starr & Stoll, supra note 2; Starr & Stall, supra note 9.
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United States settlement policies in the desert Southwest was his belief, as
described by Marc Reisner, that
state boundaries were often nonsensical ...

In the

West, where the one thing that really mattered was
water, states should logically be formed around watersheds ... To divide the West any other way was to sow

the future with rivalries, jealousies, and bitter squabnourbles whose fruits would
1 45 contribute solely to the
ishment of lawyers.
The same might belatedly be said about the national boundaries
of the Mideast. The difference, of course, is that in that region, conflicts
between states have deep historical roots and are more often settled on the
battlefield than in the courtroom.
The Jordan River watershed, with all its competing national and
economic pressures, provides a clear example of the strategic importance
of water as a scarce resource. If emphasis is placed on easing regional
water tensions, some breathing space might be gained allowing for more
complex political and historical difficulties to be negotiated. In fact,
because the water problems to be solved involve all of the parties at conflict, and because these issues are so fundamental, the search for regional
solutions may actually be used as a tool to facilitate cooperation. People
who won't talk together about history or politics may, if their lives and
economies depend on it, talk about water.
The present 'hydro-political' situation in the Mideast is one of
intricate problems and delicate solutions. The distribution of scarce water
resources in the Jordan River watershed is particularly precarious. The
dangers of conflict and the opportunities for cooperation are both growing
as annual supplies are currently being reached and surpassed. As Gideon
Fishelson of the Armand Hammer Fund for Economic Cooperation in the
Middle East writes,
the danger of war over water hangs over the heads of
the Middle East countries, yet there is also the possibility of cooperation and harnessing new technologies
and capital that would prevent such wars. Solving the
water issue is one of the essential prerequisites to
achieving46a meaningful and lasting peace in the Middle East.1

145. M. Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water 49 (1986).
146. G. Fishelson, Water and the Middle East, Israel Scene 5 (October 1990).

